The United States has experienced over 100 years of continual growth in the size and reach of the national government, which has progressively usurped, duplicated, and supplemented State activities. Both political parties have abetted this process. One can argue whether each individual step was beneficial or avoidable, but one cannot argue that this ongoing centralization is consistent with the principles of federalism, and decentralized local government.

There were good reasons for much of this expansion of the national government. Real problems were frequently addressed. But why were the States ineffectual or bypassed in addressing those problems? There are two major inter-related reasons, both rooted in failures of constitutional structure.

First, the very boundaries and size of many States are an impediment. States with small populations typically lack the economic diversity required to successfully withstand major changes in the competitiveness of their primary industry without suffering severe economic dislocation. They lack the critical mass required to independently support modern institutions such as research universities and tertiary care medical centers. They are less able to independently respond to and recover from local environmental crises, whether short term like a hurricane, or long term such as drought. These small States are therefore periodically desirous of outside help, and welcome intervention from the national government when it suits their needs. Additionally, State borders often cut through the middle of major urban areas thus complicating problem solving, pushing metro area management up to national or extra-governmental bodies.

Second, the equal voting power of each State in the Senate injects incentives into the political process which continually encourage policy issues to be pushed to the national level. It creates a temptation too strong for politicians to resist. States with small populations are in a position to extract benefits from the rest of the union — both economic and ideological. The Senators of Alaska or New Mexico do not consciously set out to take advantage of their neighbors, but merely to serve their constituents. Nevertheless, they become the focal point of a nexus of power with which both lobbyists and other Senators have to contend as they pursue their own goals. When trading votes in the Senate, the 'benefit per voter' is higher for small States, than the 'cost per voter' for a large State. Ten million dollars received by Wyoming via the national government brings $40 per voter of benefit, whereas this costs only $1.25 per voter if Texas is paying. Small State citizens are in effect more important and more valued than those in large States. This imbalance creates a constant pressure that puts the votes of the smaller States up for sale to the highest bidder. But the sale has to be made at a national level if the goods are to be delivered.

In 1880 a majority of the American labor force were farmers. By 1970, fewer than 5% were. That immense industrial and social transformation created numerous conflicts. And every one of those conflicts was subjected to a political process in which the above two factors tended to push solutions up to the national level, thus eroding the decentralized federal structure of government in the United States.

Were we to remove these two causes for the decline of federalism, there would be a fighting chance of reversing the trend of the past century. State government would be revitalized by an increase in its importance. The decision gridlock of the national government would be reduced. And, perhaps most importantly, there would be more opportunity for real diversity to develop amongst the States.

Let us re-establish federalism, as the founding generation described it in their political writings, where States are culturally, economically and geographically distinct and strong enough to be capable of independent development — and, their votes in the Senate are proportional to population. We helped grant Germany such a federal constitution after WWII (Bavaria has more votes than Hesse). Let us do the same for ourselves.

Solve both problems: re-draw the boundaries to make every State strong enough to both take care of itself and develop its own character; and apportion voting power in the Senate according to their population. Instead of 50 States, ranging in size from 575 thousand to 39 million, a ratio of 68 to 1, there would be from 15 to 25 States, ranging in size from 8 to 32 million, a ratio of 4 to 1. Each State would be anchored by one of the major cities of the country and contain significant economic diversity. The borders would be drawn in a way that respects cultural and ecological boundaries. Such strong self-sufficient States will be in a position to chart their own courses, able to resist both national political centralization, as well as the enormous lobbying power that wealthy global businesses possess.

Resolving only one of the structural problems would not be sufficient. Elimination of equal suffrage in the Senate would not be enough, as it would leave 20 states with populations under 3 million, whose weakness would constitute a permanent lobby for national action. The most effective way to revitalize federalism is to solve both problems simultaneously: redraw the borders and institute voting in the Senate proportional to population.

Such a change will be difficult to achieve. The bar is high as there is only one provision of the constitution which is not subject to amendment: (Article 5) "…no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate." But difficulty of reform is no reason to accept a pernicious and unjust situation. The vast majority of Americans, as much as 90%, would benefit from such a change.

The obstacle will be a small minority. The 20 smallest States account for only 10% of the population, yet they constitute 40% of the Senate. They will be receptive to any argument that maintains a situation in which they receive far more from the federal government than they pay in, and their votes on non-economic matters count on average for 5 times more than those of their fellow citizens. It is time to give up passivity in the face of a perceived constitutional prohibition on reform. Let us join the battle of public opinion. Mighty oaks from little acorns grow.

The constitution of the United States was conceived in sin — two conjoined sins: permanent protection of slavery from national legislation, and equal votes for States in the Senate. Penance for the first was paid with a civil war. The weight of penance for the second has been accumulating for generations, and is a major contributor to the decline of federalism and the paralysis of effective national government.

The intellectual leaders of the founding generation opposed both in the constitutional convention of 1787. They acquiesced only reluctantly and fearfully, paying the price demanded by their less publicly minded delegates, as they attempted to secure unanimity in the convention. The final bargain consisted of small States (e.g. Connecticut) and slavery-dependent States (e.g. North Carolina) trading enhanced protection of slavery for equal voting in the Senate enhancing small State power.

We cannot know if they were right to acquiesce. Washington, Madison, Franklin, Hamilton and company wagered that without this compromise there would have been no United States at all, and placed their hopes in the wisdom of future generations to resolve the conflicts they knowingly accepted.

Which delegates to the constitutional convention were opposed to equal voting in the Senate? Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, James Wilson, Robert Morris, Edmund Randolph. Which founding fathers had the same views, but were not delegates? John Adams (then ambassador to Great Britain), Thomas Jefferson (then ambassador to France), John Jay (then president of the Congress of Confederation, co-author of the Federalist Papers).

These intellectual leaders of the country, including the first 4 presidents, the first chief justice and the first secretary of the treasury, all opposed equal voting in the Senate. They were defeated by those whose only argument was their power to withhold unanimity.

There is a widespread misunderstanding of the history of 'the great compromise'. The number of votes which a State holds in the Senate is not the basis of federalism and decentralization, nor was it argued as such. Federalism rests on the concept of enumerated and limited powers, with the federal government receiving those which by necessity can only be executed effectively at the national level. The number of votes was a business deal, not a statement of political philosophy.

The boundaries of the States of the United States reflect the random meanderings of history. Any correspondence to a workable federalism is accidental. The States are the result of:

• A century of British royal charters granted to colonial land speculation ventures, during a time when Britain itself suffered a civil war and multiple revolutions. Most charters were granted to royal favorites, or used to pay royal debts;
• The accidents of wars between European empires (Holland, France, Britain and Spain) and our own war with Mexico;
• Battles between land speculators who were also political leaders of their respective States;
• Political battles over the control of the Senate between, successively: supporters of free labor versus supporters of slavery up to the Civil War, and then between the post-Civil War Republican and Democratic parties;
• Naïve demographic assumptions that equal quantities of land would eventually have equal populations.

There is no reason to treat these historical relics as sacrosanct.

Let's look at one example. New York's borders result from the Anglo-Dutch war ended in 1667 in which Britain ousted the Netherlands from their American colony. The King gave the territory to his brother, the Duke of York, who then gave the part which became New Jersey to two aristocratic followers as payment for their services. The eastern border with Connecticut resulted from a treaty between Connecticut and the Dutch in 1650. The boundaries to the north and northeast are the result of the Anglo-French & Indian war ended in 1763. These boundaries are neither economic nor cultural. They are the result of deal making, nepotism and wars.

Today, the government of the country's largest metropolis is split between 3 different States, while that part inside New York State is subject to legislative obstruction from cities 350 miles distant, whose economies are tied to the Great Lakes region. Metropolitan New York is forced to create extra-governmental structures like the Port Authority (NY and NJ) or Metropolitan Transit Authority (NY and CT) that operate beyond State boundaries in order to manage activity that would normally not even rise to the level of State government.

The few States that can play the role anticipated in a true federal system are those lucky enough to be big and populous, with borders in remote areas — e.g. Texas and California. If the federal government were to disappear tomorrow, these two States could easily adjust to the status of independent nations. Unfortunately for every Texas there is a Rhode Island and a North Dakota.

A renewed federalism is not a guarantee that a conservative, liberal, or any other particular policy will prevail at the national or state level. Many of the current controversies convulsing the federal government will simply move to multiple State venues, where the arguments will continue. Federalism states only that solutions to problems should be decided, funded, implemented and enforced at the lowest level of government that is required to make them effective.

The principle of federalism is that of empowered knowledgeable citizens acting at each level of social organization to make the decisions appropriate at that level. The more effectively decisions are pushed down to the lowest possible level; the broader is the participation of citizens in the political process and the more efficient is government.

Whether you are for or against high speed rail between, say, Portland and Seattle, is immaterial to the question of whether the decision and financing of such a project is more properly decided by a State or regional entity encompassing these cities in the Pacific Northwest, rather than at a national government level by representatives of Maine and Louisiana. Similarly, the question of how to supply housing for those with low incomes ought to be decided and financed within the confines of the economic unit whose boundaries match the wider housing market in which those people live.

It is true that federalism in the United States is subject to guilt by association, given the long history of 'States Rights' being championed by slave-owners, and their descendants — first to enslave and later to terrorize blacks into acquiescence to apartheid. Other countries with a federal system, but without our racial history, have a broad-based attachment by all political parties to the principle of decentralization — e.g. Switzerland or Germany. Even countries with strong centralized national governments are moving towards decentralization; for example, Great Britain has granted greater local control to Scotland.

By making the States of America self-sufficient and powerful, it will be possible to transfer a wide range of functions back to the States, or simply stop the duplication of efforts. Recent political rhetoric unfortunately mixes goals of federalism with specific policy objectives. Those who call for the elimination of the Department of Housing and Urban Development in the name of federalism are confined to the right of the political spectrum and they are doing so largely because they disagree with the goals of that department. They use federalism as a 'trojan horse' argument. The Left feel obligated to defend national programs, not because of opposition to federalism, but because of their support for housing subsidies. However, the elimination of the federal HUD department does not necessarily mean California would not pursue the goals of current federal HUD programs. In this proposal for renewing federalism, New York State would encompass all of the New York City metropolitan area. Such a State and city would have the capability and resources to implement any housing and urban development policy it could possibly imagine. Instead of paying taxes to the federal government which are then sent back as grants, New York would simply keep the money at home.

The process of devolution would not always be simple. Some recent contentious debates surrounding civil liberties do not cleanly fit into the logic of federalism. For example, woven throughout many departments are various programs aimed at the enforcement of laws against racial discrimination. Given that such federal defense of civil liberties has been ruled constitutional, its enforcement would remain a national function.

Federalism is neither right nor left, and it provides no answers to specific policy issues. It is a methodology aimed at decentralization and local empowerment, in order to have wider citizen participation and more effective government.

The Senate was designed to fulfill two main functions. One was to represent the interests of States to the extent that the 'character' of States differed. The other was to provide an 'aristocratic' restraint on the House of Representatives and 'democracy'.

Economically, the importance of manufacturing, ports, different crops, international trade, slaves, inland navigation, etc., varied dramatically between States. The Senate was intended to prevent national legislation that would wantonly harm the economy of one State while benefiting that of another. The fact that the primary difference between States was based on the presence or not of plantation slavery has obscured the basic federalist argument, as later generations have cast the entire 'interests of States' debate as simply a euphemism for a defense of slavery. A review of the debates at the constitutional convention shows that the broader federal principle was clearly understood and intended.

Culturally, there was a strong awareness of differences between, say, Puritan Massachusetts and Anglican Virginia. The Senate was intended to be the enforcer of the grey zone, those items that fall under the broad statement of the 10th amendment, that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." It was expected that the States would be jealous of their powers, and would use the Senate to prevent national encroachment.

The second function — 'aristocratic restraint' — is universally acknowledged by historians. The founders were all steeped in Roman history, and the very term 'Senate' stands historically for an aristocracy. They still considered the bicameral British 'balanced constitution', with a House of Lords setting limits on the Commons, as the best system ever devised. Their innovation was to attempt to create a 'republican' version of this.

What relation did equal voting in the Senate have to the two primary functions of the Senate? Regarding 'aristocratic restraint' no argument was made, no connection asserted, between equal voting and this function. This is unambiguous.

Regarding the function of representing the interests of the States, the delegates from the small States repeatedly used the phrase 'defending the interests of their States'. However, this was never argued in a way that was consistent with the principles of republican government. They did not put forward any theory of government — their argument was one of historical fact: "these States exist, they have local economies, and the current Articles of Confederation are based on equal voting." The leaders of the small States simply refused to participate in any new union other than as equals.

The record of the convention shows repeated justification of proportional votes in the Senate based on fundamental principles of republican government. A State represents its citizens, not some abstract sovereignty. Principle did not win, however, as the small States simply refused to participate.

The results for the country of this particular constitutional compromise have been pernicious and undemocratic. As Franklin, Madison and others predicted, equal voting in the Senate has created a situation where some citizens are 'more equal' than others. This has three primary negative impacts: small States receive federal benefits far out of proportion to their contributions; they have a disproportionate influence on all other policy decisions; and their surplus voting power amplifies the tendency to nationalize issues that could otherwise be dealt with at a State level.

All studies clearly show that per capita federal spending is highest in the smallest States, and lowest in the largest. The only factor that significantly distorts the long-term trend is the tendency of retirees to move to the Sun Belt. For non-discretionary spending and grants-in-aid, the complicated formulas that determine eligibility have many criteria applied in a way that makes small States gain. For the large States, they are always fighting an uphill battle, since the per voter cost to them is far lower than the per voter benefit to the small State Senator. During a negotiation, the 'walk away' power of any Senator is bigger, the smaller his State.

The most sophisticated analysis was done by the authors of Sizing up the Senate based on the years 1985–90 (Lee and Oppenheimer, University of Chicago Press, 1999). After controlling for business cycle variations and demographic factors, the difference in State-by-State federal benefits is almost perfectly correlated to the relative power of its Senators based on State population — the lower the population, the more power.

A more important negative impact is the outsized influence that small States have on the larger policy direction. A study of 'hold out' behavior of Senators during 30 contentious legislative debates over twenty years from 1978 to 1997 found that for 21 of the 30 debates, the holdout Senators were from small States. For only 4 of 30, the hold outs were from large States.

It is simply against every principle of representative government to accept the absurd situation in which the 1.4 million residents of Hawaii are granted an equal vote with the 27 million residents of Texas on an issue like immigration reform; or the 600 thousand residents of Vermont are given an equal vote with the 12 million of Ohio on the issue of carbon cap and trade policy.

Lastly, equal Senate voting is one significant contributing factor to the tendency over time to make more issues national instead of State matters. In the Senate, a majority could theoretically be put together with States representing only 18% of the population. And in the Senate, it is far easier to provide the requisite payoff needed to gain an ally. Therefore, it is more likely that single-issue crusades will first garner meaningful support in the Senate. This political grandstanding contributes to the nationalization we see in, for example, the 'War on Drugs' in criminal affairs, or the 'Race to the Top' in education.

An equally important contributor to increased national centralization is that the boundaries and size of many States limit their ability to solve problems. Lacking a critical mass of population, dependent often on one industry, small States are vulnerable to economic and ecological change. While at the other end of the scale, several large dynamic urban areas are burdened in their ability to solve problems by being split between different States.

You don't see these limitations in Texas. Many Texans talk about secession and independence. In fundamental ways, they don't need the rest of the country, and they are ostentatiously proud of their State, its strength and heritage. You don't see them asking the rest of the country to intervene and 'fix' Texas for them.

By simply listing the limitations of current State boundaries, the key criteria for new borders are illuminated:

A small State could be heavily dependent on a single industry and subject to booms and busts. Examples today and past include: Iowa and corn; West Virginia and coal; Montana and metals; Mississippi and cotton. Without economic diversity, a State can find itself subject to the political control of concentrated business interests, which may not even reside in the State itself.

Small States lack modern infrastructure in the form of private R&D centers, research universities, and advanced medical care, and are dependent on innovation from outside their borders. A State must contain an urban center which has national and international economic ties, and is big enough to successfully support advanced industry. A State without a nationally important city is simply an appendage of another State or country's economy and lacks independence.

Many cities cross State borders and must rely on extra-governmental entities and inter-State cooperation in order to manage local city affairs. Of the top 50 MSAs (Metropolitan Statistical Areas) in the US, 16 cross State borders. These 16 MSAs total 67 million in population — over 20% of the total US population. Each of these metropolitan areas has significant inter-State conflict and governmental overlap.

A small State may be unable to 'self-insure' against the caprice of nature: floods, droughts, fires, hurricanes, blizzards, tornados. If Louisiana can't manage Katrina, then perhaps a larger 'Gulf' State could.

Many States are dependent on the federal government for management of navigable rivers on their borders. Flood control on major rivers is the job of the federal government and the Army Corps of Engineers, due only to the historical accident of using rivers as convenient markers of borders. If State boundaries were based on watersheds, there would be no need for Federal management.

Where would new borders be placed? Here is the list of criteria based on the problems enumerated in the prior section:

• Some economic diversity to limit the impact of boom/bust cycles
• At least one nationally important urban center to support independent innovation
• Borders which do not split contiguous urban zones; borders in the least populous areas
• Big enough to 'self-insure' against environmental disaster
• Watersheds, not rivers, as borders

To the above list, I would add specific criteria based on principles of federalism and a decentralized structure:

• Large enough to conceivably be an independent country, meaning no fundamental economic need, ever, for financial assistance from other States — hence strong enough to effectively resist centralization
• Cultural coherence where this may be relevant in an otherwise arbitrary choice of borders, in order to both recognize and encourage the development of diversity amongst States

The next section provides an example of new boundaries drawn to re-invigorate a federal, decentralized structure, in which voting in the Senate would be proportional to population. It consists of 19 States, ranging in population from 9 million to 25 million. Today, 40 of the 50 States have populations less than 9 million.

In general, the borders follow directly from the criteria. However, there are some lingering doubts on a few sub-regions due to questions of cultural differences and adequate economic size. For example, the Mormon heartland of Utah and Eastern Idaho has a total population of only 3.5 million, which is probably below the threshold for adequate economic size, yet it is culturally very distinct from its neighbors in Colorado.

The details of the following particular example are not as important as the fact that there are far more meaningful boundaries, economically, culturally and politically, than those which we have inherited.

A proposed reorganization of the United States into 19 States, each anchored by a nationally important city, economically diverse, and ranging in population from 9 to 25 million.

Texas

Los Angeles

New York

Georgia

Erie

California

Florida

Chicago

Ohio

Missouri

Carolina

Chesapeake

New England

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Minnesota

Louisiana

Rockies

Arizona

The situation continues to worsen. In 1787, 30% of the population could form a Senate majority. Today it is down to 17.7%. In 2030 it will be 16.6%. With every Census, representation in government is further stripped from those US citizens who live in States of above average size.

The next century is already upon us. At some point, an increasingly unjust and unrepresentative situation will reach a tipping point of discontent. The minority who profit from this constitutional original sin will be unable to justify and defend the indefensible. It is certainly true that the Constitution limits the normal amendment process when it comes to "equal Suffrage in the Senate." Therefore other ways will have to be found to convince small States to join such a reform.

No matter the eventual legal vehicle for change, public opinion will have to be massively won over. I suggest that this process of persuasion can be led by the largest States themselves, beginning with California and Texas, who alone represent 20% of the entire US population — but only 4% of the Senate. They could form a league of federal reform to represent the 12 States which contain 60% of the total US population. This league would engage in research, policy development and legal challenges — documenting the ongoing disenfranchisement of their citizens, and the payment deficits due to federal spending transfers to small States.

It may seem frivolous to put any effort into such a grandly quixotic reform as redrawing all the borders of the United States and eliminating equal suffrage in the Senate. Such a reform may bear fruit only in the distant future, a time frame our political class seems no longer capable of imagining.

Not every political objective need be of immediate transcendent importance. Both long term and short term purposes can be pursued. The current situation is unjust and absurd. Why not start now? The country will eventually resolve the situation, either by becoming avowedly centralized, eliminating the Senate and further reducing the States to a merely administrative role; or, by deliberately embracing a decentralized federal structure and strengthening the States. I choose the latter path, one where regional diversity is more likely to flourish.

The following questions represent open debates central to the proposal for renewing federalism. Click any topic to read the framing question and join the discussion.